---
title: "Google Secret Manager"
description: "Google Secret Manager integration: under consideration"
url: "https://gazebohq.com/vaults/google-secret-manager"
---

We’re considering a Google Secret Manager source integration for developers connecting agents to clients’ existing Google Cloud secrets. This connector is not available today. A potential implementation would need an authenticated reader, narrowly granted IAM permissions and explicit secret-version references. It would not require moving every client secret into Gazebo or imply that Google Cloud access is already configured.

## When might another retrieval interface be useful?

Google Cloud already supports workload identities, IAM and secret-access APIs. For a workload running inside a client’s established environment, direct access may be simpler than adding a broker. A developer supporting multiple client vault products might instead value a consistent retrieval interface and an agent-specific request record. That benefit would need to be demonstrated against native integration, including the client’s approval process and the cost of another service handling plaintext credentials.

## Integration considerations

1. Google Secret Manager distinguishes secret-value access from metadata visibility. Its Secret Accessor role can be granted at secret scope; a potential reader should not receive broad project access merely for convenience.
2. The reader’s authentication would need a client-approved design appropriate to its hosting environment. A service-account email or project identifier alone is not authentication, and long-lived key export should not be assumed necessary.
3. Secret project, name and version references would need explicit mapping and customer isolation. A selected agent mapping would not reduce the authority of a source identity with wider IAM grants.
4. Disabled or unavailable versions, permission changes, quotas and network restrictions would need safe failure behaviour. There is no supported Gazebo-to-Google Secret Manager onboarding or live retrieval flow today.
5. Source audit records and agent retrieval decisions describe access, not subsequent provider actions. Revoking reader permissions would stop future reads, not retract credentials already copied into an agent runtime.

Provider documentation: https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/access-control

## Workflows we’re evaluating

**A shared contract across client vaults:** A possible connector could let an agent developer reference an approved client secret through the same retrieval interface used for other sources. The client would remain responsible for granting and reviewing Google Cloud source access; Gazebo would need to demonstrate reduced integration work.

**Selected-secret access reviews:** A future workflow could link named-agent requests to approved secret references for review alongside the client’s existing records. Whether that adds useful context depends on the current workload identities and logging; an extra audit stream is not automatically better.

## Available today

Gazebo stores credentials in its own encrypted vault and records agent credential-retrieval attempts. It does not currently read live secrets from Google Secret Manager. Authorized retrieval delivers the provider key to the runtime and host; provider permissions govern later use. Revoking retrieval does not invalidate keys already returned.

[Discuss your Google Secret Manager workflow](https://gazebohq.com/contact?vault=google-secret-manager) or email hello@gazebohq.com. Please don’t send credentials or sensitive client information.
